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Suite 701, Gelman Library This memorandum from General Groves to General Marshall captured how far the Manhattan Project had come in less than two years since Bushs December 1942 report to President Roosevelt. By contrast, Herbert P. Bix has suggested that the Japanese leadership would probably not have surrendered if the Truman administration had spelled out the status of the emperor. Seeing the bombing of Hiroshima as a sign of a worsening situation at home, Tagaki worried about further deterioration. The destruction was. Brown recounted Byrnes debriefing of the 10 August White House meeting on the Japanese peace offer, an account which differed somewhat from that in the Stimson diary. Thousands died later from radiation sickness. Hasegawa, 105; Alperovitz, 67-72; Forrest Pogue,George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-1959(New York: Viking, 1987), 18. The contacts never went far and Dulles never received encouragement to pursue them. Whether Eisenhower expressed such reservations prior to Hiroshima will remain a matter of controversy. The bomb was built in 1961 by a group of Soviet physicists that notably included . This set of documents concerns the work of the Uranium Committee of the National Academy of Sciences, an exploratory project that was the lead-up to the actual production effort undertaken by the Manhattan Project. Since the 1960s, when the declassification of important sources began, historians have engaged in vigorous debate over the bomb and the end of World War II. Thousands more would die of radiation exposure. On the eve of the Potsdam Conference, a State Department draft of the proclamation to Japan contained language which modified unconditional surrender by promising to retain the emperor. Japanese kamikaze pilots could turn planes into guided missiles. According to a Joint Chiefs of Staff report on Japanese target systems, expected results from the bombing campaign included: The absorption of man-hours in repair and relief; the dislocation of labor by casualty; the interruption of public services necessary to production, and above all the destruction of factories engaged in war industry. While Stimson would later raise questions about the bombing of Japanese cities, he was largely disengaged from the details (as he was with atomic targeting). Some will want to read declassified primary sources so they can further develop their own thinking about the issues. [16], RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent the point of no return in the history of world politics: they mark the dramatic culmination and end of the war, while symbolizing the beginning of an era of nuclear fear. This personal account, written on Tinian, reports his fears about the danger of a nuclear accident, the confusion surrounding the Nagasaki attack, and early Air Force thinking about a nuclear strike force. Why the United States dropped the Atomic Bomb - 1239 Words | 123 Help Me Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog. The force of B-29 nuclear delivery vehicles that was being readied for first nuclear usethe Army Air Forces 509th Composite Grouprequired an operational base in the Western Pacific. 1947: How the American people feel about the atomic bomb See Bernstein (1995), 142. Atomic Bomb Dbq in World War II Essay Example | GraduateWay Historians have used this item in the papers of Byrnes aide, Walter Brown, to make a variety of points. [37], RG 165, Army Operations OPD Executive File #17, Item 13 (copy courtesy of J. Samuel Walker), The day after the Togo message was reported, Army intelligence chief Weckerling proposed several possible explanations of the Japanese diplomatic initiative. The US bombed Japan in 1945 to demonstrate its power to the USSR Tagaki was soon at the center of a cabal of Japanese defense officials, civil servants, and academics, which concluded that, in the end, the emperor would have to impose his decision on the military and the government. Takagi kept a detailed account of his activities, part of which was in diary form, the other part of which he kept on index cards. NYTimes Some years after Trumans death, a hand-written diary that he kept during the Potsdam conference surfaced in his personal papers. zhuri james net worth 2021 . Read more, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NWWashington, DC 20004-3027, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project. My analysis will provide some historical and political context and offer an initial assessment of these documents. When the Foreign Minister met with the Emperor, Hirohito agreed with him; he declared that the top priority was an early end to the war, although it would be acceptable to seek better surrender terms--probably U.S. acceptance of a figure-head emperor--if it did not interfere with that goal. Historians Reassess: Did we need to drop the bomb? [2] During the 1960s the availability of primary sources made historical research and writing possible and the debate became more vigorous. Obama in Hiroshima: Why the U.S. Dropped the Bomb in 1945 | Time On August 9th, 1945, Truman declared that the use of the A-bomb had saved THOUSANDS of American lives. Members of the Supreme War Councilthe Big Six[62]wanted the reply to Potsdam to include at least four conditions (e.g., no occupation, voluntary disarmament); they were willing to fight to the finish. Marshall noted the opprobrium which might follow from an ill considered employment of such force. This document has played a role in arguments developed by Barton J. Bernstein that figures such as Marshall and Stimson were caught between an older morality that opposed the intentional killing of non-combatants and a newer one that stressed virtually total war.[22], RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. Marshall was not sure whether that was so although Stimson privately believed that the atomic bomb would provide enough to force surrender (see entry for July 23). 5b and 5e (copies from microfilm), These messages convey the process of creating and transmitting the execution order to bomb Hiroshima. which was the world's first atomic bomb to be used in welfare. ], Documents 1A-C: Report of the Uranium Committee, National Archives, Records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, Record Group 227 (hereinafter RG 227), Bush-Conant papers microfilm collection, Roll 1, Target 2, Folder 1, "S-1 Historical File, Section A (1940-1941).". [67], National Archives, RG 165, Army Operations OPD, Executive Files 1940-1945, box 12, Exec #2. Over 200,000 people were killed. RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. We gave them fair warning and asked them to quit. For the extensive literature, see the references in J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan,Third Edition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016) at 131-136, as well as Walkers, Recent Literature on Trumans Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground,Diplomatic History29 (April 2005): 311-334. Togo could not persuade the cabinet, however, and the Army wanted to delay any decisions until it had learned what had happened to Hiroshima. He wanted to end war in the Pacific without having to invade Japan b. In a long and impassioned message, the latter argued why Japan must accept defeat: it is meaningless to prove ones devotion [to the Emperor] by wrecking the State. Togo rejected Satos advice that Japan could accept unconditional surrender with one qualification: the preservation of the Imperial House. Probably unable or unwilling to take a soft position in an official cable, Togo declared that the whole country will pit itself against the enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will as long as the enemy demands unconditional surrender., Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, James Forrestal Diaries, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was a regular recipient of Magic intercept reports; this substantial entry reviews the dramatic Sato-Togo exchanges covered in the 22 July Magic summary (although Forrestal misdated Satos cable as first of July instead of the 21st). A few days later another Japanese city, Nagasaki, was obliterated by a second atomic bomb. This document is a typed-up version of the hand-written original (which Browns family has provided to Clemson University). That is, the United States could possibly be in danger if the Nazis acquired more knowledge about how to build a bomb. That possibility would be difficult if the United States made first military use of the weapon. Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - The Unwritten Record The war had shown that the Japanese were fighting for the Emperor who convinced them that it was better to die than surrender. [23]. RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. Background on the U. S. Atomic Project, III. [39], The last item discusses Japanese contacts with representatives of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Switzerland. What these people were laboring to construct, directly or indirectly, were two types of weaponsa gun-type weapon using U-235 and an implosion weapon using plutonium (although the possibility of U-235 was also under consideration). With Truman having ordered a halt to the atomic bombings [See document 78], Marshall wrote on Grove's memo that the bomb was not to be released over Japan without express authority from the President., Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Papers of W. Averell Harriman, box 181, Chron File Aug 10-12, 1945, Japans prospective surrender was the subject of detailed discussion between Harriman, British Ambassador Kerr, and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov during the evening of August 10 (with a follow-up meeting occurring at 2 a.m.). This. Some may associate this statement with one that Eisenhower later recalled making to Stimson. On the August 6, 1945, the world's first atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, by the United States. In the surprise attack, Japan sunk several ships, destroyed hundreds of planes and ended thousands of lives. This issue of the diplomatic summary also includes Togos account of his notification of the Soviet declaration of war, reports of Soviet military operations in the Far East, and intercepts of French diplomatic traffic. The result was approximately 80,000 deaths in just the first few minutes. The Soviets already knew about the U.S. atomic project from espionage sources in the United States and Britain so Molotovs comment to Ambassador Harriman about the secrecy surrounding the U.S. atomic project can be taken with a grain of salt, although the Soviets were probably unaware of specific plans for nuclear use. With Secretary of War Stimson presiding, members of the committee heard reports on a variety of Manhattan Project issues, including the stages of development of the atomic project, problems of secrecy, the possibility of informing the Soviet Union, cooperation with like-minded powers, the military impact of the bomb on Japan, and the problem of undesirable scientists. In his comments on a detonation over Japanese targets, Oppenheimer mentioned that the neutron effect would be dangerous to life for a radius of at least two-thirds of a mile, but did not mention that the radiation could cause prolonged sickness. The bomb ended the war. [19]. How and when it should be used had been the subject of high-level debate for months. By early August he decided that 9-10 August 1945 would be the best dates for striking Japanese forces in Manchuria. The notion that the atomic bombs caused . The documents may even provoke new questions. Fax: 202/994-7005Contact by email. Why we dropped the Atomic Bomb The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945 was a definite turning point in the Pacific War of World . Stimson did not always have Trumans ear, but historians have frequently cited his diary when he was at the Potsdam conference. Whether or not the atomic bombs should have been dropped is a topic that is still debated. [12]. [54], This summary included several intercepted messages from Sato, who conveyed his despair and exasperation over what he saw as Tokyos inability to develop terms for ending the war: [I]f the Government and the Military dilly-dally in bringing this resolution to fruition, then all Japan will be reduced to ashes. Sato remained skeptical that the Soviets would have any interest in discussions with Tokyo: it is absolutely unthinkable that Russia would ignore the Three Power Proclamation and then engage in conversations with our special envoy., Documents 60A-D: These messages convey the process of creating and transmitting the execution order to bomb Hiroshima. [38]. There Stimson kept track of S-1 developments, including news of the successful first test (see entry for July 16) and the ongoing deployments for nuclear use against Japan. Historian believed that there are two different possibilities. Initialed by President Roosevelt (VB OK FDR), this may have been the closest that he came to a formal approval of the Manhattan Project. Because the Japanese population was far from surrendering and would fight to their death, so an invasion would be costly in human lives. Bix, Japan's Surrender Decision and the Monarchy: Staying the Course in an Unwinnable War,Japan Focus. To help readers who are less familiar with the debates, commentary on some of the documents will point out, although far from comprehensively, some of the ways in which they have been interpreted. The author recommended issuing the declaration just before the bombardment program [against Japan] reaches its peak. Next to that suggestion, Stimson or someone in his immediate office, wrote S1, implying that the atomic bombing of Japanese cities was highly relevant to the timing issue. In accordance with the dinners rules that reporters are never present, Trumans remarks were off-the record. Truman, already on his way to Europe, never saw the petition.[35]. Harriman opined that surrender is in the bag because of the Potsdam Declarations provision that the Japanese could choose their own form of government, which would probably include the Emperor. Further, the only alternative to the Emperor is Communism, implying that an official role for the Emperor was necessary to preserve social stability and prevent social revolution. For the inception of the Soviet nuclear program and the role of espionage in facilitating it, see Holloway,Stalin and the Bomb(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994). With the Japanese surrender announcement not yet in, President Truman believed that another atomic bombing might become necessary. Nevertheless, his diary suggests that military hard-liners were very much in charge and that Prime Minister Suzuki was talking tough against surrender, by evoking last ditch moments in Japanese history and warning of the danger that subordinate commanders might not obey surrender orders. For Groves and the problem of radiation sickness, see Norris, 339-441, Bernstein, Reconsidering the Atomic General: Leslie R. Groves,Journal of Military History67 (2003), 907-908, and Malloy, A Very Pleasant Way to Die, 513-518 and 539-542. It is commonly believed that the awesome devastation of the atomic bombs caused the Japanese government to capitulate. Was there another way to end the war? Drawing on sources at the National Archives and the Library of Congress as well as Japanese materials, this electronic briefing book includes key documents that historians of the events have relied upon to present their findings and advance their interpretations. [59a], Takashi Itoh, ed., Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho [Sokichi Takagi: Diary and Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 923-924 [Translation by Hikaru Tajima]. President Truman, who ordered the bomb, defended it as a way to bring about surrender and save U.S. military lives that would have been lost in a ground invasion of Japan. Japans cultural capital, Kyoto, would not stay on the list. The Soviet source reported that the weight of the device was 3 tons (which was in the ball park) and forecast an explosive yield of 5 kilotons. For emphasis on the shock of the atomic bomb, see also Lawrence Freedman and Saki Dockrill, Hiroshima: A Strategy of Shock, in Saki Dockrill, ed.,From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima : the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, 1941-1945(New York, St. Martins Press, 1994), 191-214. Which of the following was least likely a reason for Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb? The US went forward with their actions so they can prevent a mass loss of their population from any actions japan might present. Contributors to the historical controversy have deployed the documents selected here to support their arguments about the first use of nuclear weapons and the end of World War II. Frightened by the rapid movement of Soviet forces into Manchuria and worried that the army might launch a coup, the peace party set in motion a plan to persuade Hirohito to meet with the cabinet and the Big Six to resolve the stalemate over the response to the Allies. Still unaware of radiation effects, Truman emphasized the explosive yield. However, as soon as the Allied occupation of Japan came into force on September 19, the strict press code imposed by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, as well as the above-mentioned self-censorship imposed by the Japanese press, caused a delay in the way the atomic bombings were reported upon in Japan. The parts that are highlighted in the report with a line on the left-hand margin are noteworthy. The Soviet invasion was.[58], Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter J. The dropping of two atomic bombs, the tremendous destruction caused by U.S. bombing, and the Soviet declaration of war notwithstanding, important elements of the Japanese Army were unwilling to yield, as was evident from intercepted messages dated 12 and 13 August. Malloy (2008), 49-50. For casualty figures and the experience of people on the ground, see Frank, 264-268 and 285-286, among many other sources. By contrast, Maddox argues that Nagasaki was necessary so that Japanese hardliners could not minimize the first explosion or otherwise explain it away. Read more, The Nuclear Proliferation International History Project is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews, and other empirical sources. The Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, brought the United States officially into World War II. [77]. The discussion of available targets included Hiroshima, the largest untouched target not on the 21st Bomber Command priority list. But other targets were under consideration, including Yawata (northern Kyushu), Yokohama, and Tokyo (even though it was practically rubble.) The problem was that the Air Force had a policy of laying waste to Japans cities which created tension with the objective of reserving some urban targets for nuclear destruction. Atomic diplomacy refers to attempts to use the threat of nuclear warfare to achieve diplomatic goals. Atomic bomb question.pdf - The US decision to drop an [73] As it turned out, a few hours later, at 4:05 p.m., the White House received the Japanese surrender announcement. (Copy from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-AEC), A nuclear weapon of the "Fat Man" type, the plutonium implosion-type detonated over Nagasaki. Why the United States Did Not Demonstrate the Bomb's Power, Ahead of Bernsteins detailed commentary on Trumans diary has not been reproduced here except for the opening pages where he provides context and background. Atomic Bomb Dbq; Atomic Bomb Dbq. According to an Eyewitness Account (and Estimates Heard) In Regard to the Bombing of Hiroshima: Casualties have been estimated at 100,000 persons., Zenshiro Hoshina, Daitoa Senso Hishi: Hoshina Zenshiro Kaiso-roku [Secret History of the Greater East Asia War: Memoir of Zenshiro Hoshina] (Tokyo, Japan: Hara-Shobo, 1975), excerpts from Section 5, The Emperor made go-seidan [= the sacred decision] the decision to terminate the war, 139-149 [translation by Hikaru Tajima]. Document B: Thank God for the Atomic Bomb My division, like most of the ones transferred from Europe was . 4 (copy from microfilm), General Groves prepared for Stimson, then at Potsdam, a detailed account of the Trinity test. The last remark aggravated Navy Minister Yonai who saw it as irresponsible. Barton J. Bernsteins 1987 article, Ike and Hiroshima: Did He Oppose It?The Journal of Strategic Studies10 (1987): 377-389, makes a case against relying on Eisenhowers memoirs and points to relevant circumstantial evidence. Such details and information may have been useful for the Soviet atomic bomb project, pushing the internal narrative that the USSR needed its own weapon as soon as possible. Robert J. Maddox has cited this document to support his argument that top U.S. officials recognized that Japan was not close to surrender because Japan was trying to stave off defeat. In a close analysis of this document, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, who is also skeptical of claims that the Japanese had decided to surrender, argues that each of the three possibilities proposed by Weckerling contained an element of truth, but none was entirely correct. This document has also figured in the argument framed by Barton Bernstein that Truman and his advisers took it for granted that the bomb was a legitimate weapon and that there was no reason to explore alternatives to military use. Did America drop the bomb in revenge, to prevent the USSR spreading? The bombings were the first time that nuclear weapons had been detonated in combat operations. 24, tab D, Soon after he was sworn in as president following President Roosevelts death, Harry Truman learned about the top secret Manhattan Projectfrom briefingsbySecretary of War Stimson and Manhattan Project chief General Groves (who went through the back door to escape the watchful press). The editor particularly benefited from the source material cited in the following works: Robert S. Norris,Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie S. Groves, The Manhattan Projects Indispensable Man(South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 2002); Gar Alperovitz,The Decision to Use the Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth(New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1995); Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire(New York: Random House, 1999), Martin Sherwin,A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Origins of the Arm Race(New York, Vintage Books, 1987), and as already mentioned, HasegawasRacing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2005). More intercepted messages on the bombing of Hiroshima. To what extent did subsequent justification for the atomic bomb exaggerate or misuse wartime estimates for U.S. casualties stemming from an invasion of Japan? And on Aug. 6, a bomb would fall on Hiroshima, ultimately killing an. Besides Truman, guests included New York Governor Thomas Dewey (Republican presidential candidate in 1944 and 1948), foreign ambassadors, members of the cabinet and the Supreme Court, the military high command, and various senators and representatives. [74]. The question is: The Untied States decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was a diplomatic measure calculated to intimidate the Soviet Union in the post-Second-World-War era rather then a strictly military measure designed to force Japan's unconditional suuender. August 4, 2015 A few months after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, General Dwight D.Eisenhower commented during a social occasion how he had hoped that the war might have ended without our having to use the atomic bomb. This virtually unknown evidence from the diary of Robert P. Meiklejohn, an assistant to Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, published for the first time today by the National Security Archive, confirms that the future President Eisenhower had early misgivings about the first use of atomic weapons by the United States.
